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Karotz Smart Rabbit 12.07.19.00 - Multiple Vulnerabilities

Karotz Smart Rabbit 12.07.19.00 - Multiple Vulnerabilities

Publié le 2013-08-02

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Trustwave SpiderLabs Security Advisory TWSL2013-021:

Multiple Vulnerabilities in Karotz Smart Rabbit



Published: 08/01/13

Version: 1.0



Vendor: Electronic Arts (http://www.ea.com/), formerly Mindscape, formerly Violet

Product: Karotz

Version affected:  12.07.19.00



Product description:

Karotz is the successor to the "Nabaztag". Nabaztag is a Wi-Fi enabled

ambient electronic device in the shape of a rabbit, invented by Rafi

Haladjian and Olivier Mével, and manufactured by the company Violet.[1]

Nabaztag was designed to be a "smart object" comparable to those

manufactured by Ambient Devices; it can connect to the Internet (to

download weather forecasts, read its owner's email, etc.). It is also

customizable and programmable to an extent.



Finding 1: Python Module Hijacking

*****Credit: Daniel Crowley of Trustwave SpiderLabs

CVE: CVE-2013-4867

CWE: CWE-427



During the setup process for a Karotz unit, if wifi is selected as the

method used to connect to the Internet, a python script named "autorunwifi"

is run as root to set up the wifi connectivity. This file, along with

several others, is placed in the root of a USB flash drive or hard drive.

Another file, named "autorunwifi.sig", contains a signature of autorunwifi

signed with the private key for Violet, to prevent modifications to the

"autorunwifi" script.



Since Python first attempts to load modules not built into Python from the

same directory as the invoked script, it is possible to override the

functionality of imported modules by placing a file with the same basename

as the module being imported and an extension of ".py". In this case, it is

possible to write a Python script named "simplejson.py" and place it in the

same directory as the other setup files, which will cause the contents of

simplejson.py to be executed at the beginning of the "autorunwifi" script

execution.



This attack requires a USB flash drive to be plugged into the Karotz unit,

and requires the Karotz to be turned off and on.



The following is a proof of concept "simplejson.py" file that will copy the

pubring.gpg file from the Karotz onto the inserted USB key, which is

processed with MD5 to produce the key used to decrypt the root filesystem

for the Karotz:



## simplejson.py

import os



os.system("cp /karotz/etc/gpg/pubring.gpg /mnt/usbkey")

## end simplejson.py



Finding 2: API Session Token Passed in Cleartext

*****Credit: Daniel Crowley of Trustwave SpiderLabs

CVE: CVE-2013-4868



There are two kinds of applications for the Karotz: hosted and external.

Hosted applications are stored and run on the Karotz itself. External

applications run outside the Karotz unit and control the Karotz through an

api at api.karotz.com. Both types of applications must specifically request

to use parts of the karotz in the manifest file of their application

package. For instance, if your application uses the webcam and ears, you

must specify in your application manifest that these will be used by your

application before they will be available to your application.



The control is performed over plaintext HTTP. As such, the session token

authenticating API calls used to control the Karotz is available to an

eavesdropping attacker. The session token can be used to perform any remote

API call available to the application. For instance, if the application

uses the webcam, a video could be captured using the webcam and sent to an

arbitrary server.





Vendor Response:

No response received.



Remediation Steps:

No official patch is available.  To limit exposure,

network access to these devices should be limited to authorized

personnel through the use of Access Control Lists and proper

network segmentation.



Revision History:

06/19/13 - Attempt to contact vendor

07/10/13 - Attempt to contact vendor

07/12/13 - Attempt to contact vendor

08/01/13 - Advisory published



Additional Credits:

Discussion of Python module loading behavior and initial suggestion of

application to Karotz by Jennifer Savage



References

1. http://www.karotz.com

2. http://savagejen.github.io/blog/2013/04/28/python-module-hijacking/





About Trustwave:

Trustwave is the leading provider of on-demand and subscription-based

information security and payment card industry compliance management

solutions to businesses and government entities throughout the world. For

organizations faced with today's challenging data security and compliance

environment, Trustwave provides a unique approach with comprehensive

solutions that include its flagship TrustKeeper compliance management

software and other proprietary security solutions. Trustwave has helped

thousands of organizations--ranging from Fortune 500 businesses and large

financial institutions to small and medium-sized retailers--manage

compliance and secure their network infrastructure, data communications and

critical information assets. Trustwave is headquartered in Chicago with

offices throughout North America, South America, Europe, Africa, China and

Australia. For more information, visit https://www.trustwave.com



About Trustwave SpiderLabs:

SpiderLabs(R) is the advanced security team at Trustwave focused on

application security, incident response, penetration testing, physical

security and security research. The team has performed over a thousand

incident investigations, thousands of penetration tests and hundreds of

application security tests globally. In addition, the SpiderLabs Research

team provides intelligence through bleeding-edge research and proof of

concept tool development to enhance Trustwave's products and services.

https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs



Disclaimer:

The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without

warranty of any kind. Trustwave disclaims all warranties, either express or

implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a

particular purpose. In no event shall Trustwave or its suppliers be liable

for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental,

consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if

Trustwave or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such

damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability

for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not

apply.



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