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EMC Celerra NAS Appliance - Unauthorized Access to Root NFS Export

EMC Celerra NAS Appliance - Unauthorized Access to Root NFS Export

Publié le 2010-08-03

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Trustwave's SpiderLabs Security Advisory TWSL2010-003:

Unauthorized access to root NFS export on EMC Celerra Network Attached

Storage

(NAS) appliance



https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs/advisories/TWSL2010-003.txt



Published: 2010-07-29 Version: 1.0



Vendor: EMC (http://www.emc.com)

Product: Celerra Unified Storage products

(http://www.emc.com/products/family/celerra-family.htm)

Version(s) affected: All



Product Description:

The Celerra Unified Storage Platform provides Network Attached Storage (NAS)

services through a combination of server appliances and software modules.



Credit: Steve Ocepek of Trustwave's SpiderLabs



CVE: CVE-2010-2860



Finding:

The Celerra appliance's NFS server freely exports its "/" file system and

enforces access using a factory-defined list of authorized IP addresses.

The

addresses found on a recent model are listed in the showmount example below,

however this list may differ depending on product version. The IP addresses

are intended for communication internal to the appliance, but are still

accepted from external sources. An attacker can mount this file system by

spoofing an authorized IP address.



The NFS showmount command can be used to obtain a list of the IP addresses:



     # showmount -e <Celerra IP address>

     Export list for <Celerra IP address>:

     / 128.221.253.101,128.221.252.101,128.221.253.100,128.221.252.100



Because the appliance's NFS server does not enable the "rootsquash" feature,

full access to the file system is possible by mounting the export using root

(UID 0).



Fully spoofing the source IP address (for sending and receiving packets)

will

usually require access to the local subnet or the ability to exploit some

other network infrastructure vulnerability. On Linux, local IP address

spoofing can be accomplished by creating an alias interface and using the

"ip route" command to set the source IP accordingly.



     # ifconfig eth0:0 128.221.253.101

     # ip route add <Celerra IP address> dev eth0 src 128.221.253.101

     # mkdir nfs

     # mount <Celerra IP address>:/ nfs





The flaw allows unauthorized access to files contained on the system,

including all CIFS shares and iSCSI mounted drives. The "/" path does not

correspond to the true root of the file system -- only the root of the user

data directory is exposed.



Vendor Response:

The vendor has acknowledged this issue and issued the following workaround.



Vendor has also published a knowledgebase article about the issue and

mitigation so support can help any customers who call in with this issue

until

a permanent fix from EMC is available.



Vendor estimated date for a code fix is Q3 2010.



Remediation Steps: 



The following recommendations were provided by the vendor.



1. Hide NFS exports and show it only based on the configured access. Setting

forceFullShowmount param to 0 (default is 1) will hide the "/" from the list

since only Control Station have access to it for administration purpose:



[root () virgil slot_3]# server_param server_3 -f mount -info

forceFullShowmount



server_3 : 

name                    = forceFullShowmount

facility_name           = mount

default_value           = 1

current_value           = 1

configured_value        =

user_action             = none

change_effective        = immediate

range                   = (0,1)

description             = Forces response to showmount requests to fully

                          populate response.



[root () virgil slot_3]# server_param server_3 -f mount -modify \

forceFullShowmount -value 0



server_3 : done



After the above change, client will see only the shares he have permissions

to

access to:



/usr/sbin/showmount -e 172.24.97.3

Export list for 172.24.97.3:

/fs1 (everyone)



2. Change default IP addresses (during install or after) for internal

network

along with first step above to further minimize the exploitability.



Product team has provided additional mitigations steps that can be

implemented

by the customers to reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability:



1. Create IP-based access rules on the network equipment rejecting traffic

for

IP addresses belonging to internal Celerra network which do have own switch

for that purpose. These addresses are listed in the /etc/hosts file of the

Celerra Control Station.



2. Configure firewall(s) between Data Movers and NFS clients to reject

traffic

for IP addresses belonging to the internal Celerra network.



3. Hide NFS exports and show it only based on the configured access. Setting

forceFullShowmount param to 0 (default is 1) will hide the ³/² from the list

since only Control Station have access to it for administration purpose.



4.    Disable IP reflect



Vendor Communication Timeline:

05/07/10 - Initial communication

05/10/10 - Vulnerability details provided

05/18/10 - Vulnerability acknowledged, workaround and timeline provided

07/27/10 - Additional workaround details provided



Revision History: 

1.0 Initial publication



About Trustwave:

Trustwave is the leading provider of on-demand and subscription-based

information security and payment card industry compliance management

solutions

to businesses and government entities throughout the world. For

organizations

faced with today's challenging data security and compliance environment,

Trustwave provides a unique approach with comprehensive solutions that

include

its flagship TrustKeeper compliance management software and other

proprietary

security solutions. Trustwave has helped thousands of organizations--ranging

from Fortune 500 businesses and large financial institutions to small and

medium-sized retailers--manage compliance and secure their network

infrastructure, data communications and critical information assets.

Trustwave

is headquartered in Chicago with offices throughout North America,

South America, Europe, Africa, China and Australia. For more information,

visit https://www.trustwave.com



About Trustwave's SpiderLabs:

SpiderLabs is the advance security team at Trustwave responsible for

incident

response and forensics, ethical hacking and application security tests for

Trustwave's clients. SpiderLabs has responded to hundreds of security

incidents, performed thousands of ethical hacking exercises and tested the

security of hundreds of business applications for Fortune 500 organizations.

For more information visit https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs



Disclaimer:

The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without

warranty

of any kind. Trustwave disclaims all warranties, either express or implied,

including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular

purpose. In no event shall Trustwave or its suppliers be liable for any

damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential,

loss of business profits or special damages, even if Trustwave or its

suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states

do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or

incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.



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