Conceptronic Wireless Pan & Tilt Network Camera - Cross-Site Request Forgery

**General Details**



Affected Product: Conceptronic camera CIPCAMPTIWL

Tested Firmware: 21.37.2.49

Tested Web UI Firmware: 0.61.4.18

Assigned CVE: CVE-2013-7204

CVSSv2 Base Score: 5.8 (AV:N/AC:M/AU:N/C:P/I:P/A:N)

Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Request Forgery [CWE-352]

Solution Status: Not Fixed

Vendor Notification Timeline:

    - 23/12/2013: Contacting with technical support through their web

form http://www.conceptronic.net/supcon.php?action=init

    - 23/12/2013: Contacting with general information email addres

(info@conceptronic.net) to inform about the vulnerability and request

suitable security or technical contact to send the complete details of

the CSRF.

    - 25/12/2013: Contacting with public twitter accounts

@conceptronic and @conceptronic_es to request suitable security or

technical contact to send the complete details of the CSRF.

    - 28/12/2013: Recontacting the technical support.

    - 28/12/2013: Recontacting general information address

info@conceptronic.net.

    - 02/01/2014: Trying to conntact with security@conceptronic.net y

vulnerabilities@conceptronic.net but they are non existent addresses.

    - 03/01/2014: Involve Inteco CERT in the notification proccess.

    - 08/01/2014: Inteco confirms that there is still no response from

Conceptronic.



None of the comunication atempts with the vendor received a response,

so I'm publishing the advisory to warn users and confirm the

vulnerability with you.



**Vulnerabilitty details**



The CSRF is present in the CGI formulary used to create and modify

users of the web interface of the camera (/set_users.cgi). This CSRF

would allow a malicious attacker to create users in the camera web

interface (including administrator users) if he is able to lure the

legitimate administrator of the camera to visit a web controlled by

the attacker.



An example of the process to exploit this vulnerability:



1- A webcam administrator is already logged in the camera web interface.



2- A malicious user knows it and send a link to this administrator

pointing to a web controlled by this attacker

(http://example.com/conceptronic_csrf.html). In this web, the attacker

placed an image with the following code:



  <img alt="csrf image"

src="http://<victim_camera_server>/set_users.cgi?next_url=rebootme.htm&user1=attacker&pwd1=attacker&pri1=2&user2=&pwd2=&pri2=0&user3=&pwd3=&pri3=0&user4=&pwd4=&pri4=0&user5=&pwd5=&pri5=0&user6=&pwd6=&pri6=0&user7=&pwd7=&pri7=0&user8=&pwd8=&pri8=0">



3- The webcam administrator visit the link.



4- The page http://example.com/test_csrf.html tries to load the image

by making a GET request to the pointed URL, thus, making the

legitimate administrator to create a new user identified by "attacker"

and password "attacker".



A video was uploaded to youtube showing this behaviour:



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URXEe_VRc74



This issue can be fixed by adding an additional step to the user

creation CGI, either requesting the administrator password again

before creating/modifying any user or creating a hidden random token

for each form (https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)



-- 

Felipe Molina de la Torre