dnaLIMS DNA Sequencing - Directory Traversal / Session Hijacking / Cross-Site Scripting

Title: Multiple vulnerabilities discovered in dnaLIMS DNA sequencing

web-application

Advisory URL: https://www.shorebreaksecurity.com/blog/product-security-advisory-psa0002-dnalims/

Date published: Mar 08, 2017

Vendor: dnaTools, Inc.

CVE IDs: [2017-6526, 2017-6527, 2017-6528, 2017-6529]

USCERT VU: 929263



Vulnerability Summaries

1) Improperly protected web shell [CVE-2017-6526]

dnaLIMS requires authentication to view cgi-bin/dna/sysAdmin.cgi, which is

a web shell included with the software running as the web user.  However,

sending a POST request to that page bypasses authentication checks,

including the UID parameter within the POST request.



2) Unauthenticated Directory Traversal [CVE-2017-6527]

The viewAppletFsa.cgi seqID parameter is vulnerable to a null terminated

directory traversal attack. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to

retrieve files on the operating system accessible by the permissions of the

web server. This page also does not require authentication, allowing any

person on the Internet to exploit this vulnerability.



3) Insecure Password Storage  [CVE-2017-6528]

An option, which is most likely the default, allows the password file

(/home/dna/spool/.pfile) to store clear text passwords.  When combined with

the unauthenticated directory traversal vulnerability, it is possible to

gain the username and password for all users of the software and gain

complete control of the software.



4) Session Hijacking [CVE-2017-6529]

Each user of the dnaLIMS software is assigned a unique four-digit user

identification number(UID) upon account creation.  These numbers appear to

be assigned sequentially. Multiple pages of the dnaLIMS application require

that this UID be passed as a URL parameter in order to view the content of

the page.

Consider the following example:

The URL ahttp://<SERVER NAME

REDACTED>/cgi-bin/dna/seqreq2N.cgi?username=61685578,2410a is a valid URL

to view the page for sequencing requests for the user with the UID of 2410. The

username parameter of the URL is the mechanism for authentication to the

system. The first eight-digit number of the username parameter appears to

be a session identifier as it changes every time the user logs in from the

password.cgi page, however this value is not checked by the seqreq2N.cgi

page. This allows an attacker to guess the four-digit UID of valid user

accounts that have an active session. The user with the UID of 2419

currently has an active session, so we can simply hijack this useras

session by requesting this page and specifying the UID 2419.



5) Cross-site Scripting

The seqID parameter of the viewAppletFsa.cgi page is vulnerable to a

reflected cross site scripting attack via GET request as seen in the

following URL:

http://<SERVER NAME REDACTED>/cgi-bin/dna/viewAppletFsa.cgi?seqID=7415-7<SCRIPT

Alert("XSS") </SCRIPT>



6) Cross-site Scripting

The navUserName parameter of the seqTable*.cgi page is vulnerable to a

reflected cross site scripting attack via POST request as seen in the

example below. The * reflects a short name for a client, (ie Shorebreak

Security may be seqTableSS.cgi or seqTableshorebreak.cgi) and may not be

vulnerable for all dnaLIMS installs.



7) Improperly Protected Content



Many of the pages within the admin interface are not properly protected

from viewing by authenticated users.  This can give an attacker additional

system information about the system, or change system/software

configuration.



Software was conducted on a live production system, therefore the pages

themselves were tested, forms within these pages were not.



This is also not an exhaustive list of improperly protected pages:



cgi-bin/dna/configuration.cgi



cgi-bin/dna/createCoInfo.cgi



cgi-bin/dna/configSystem.cgi



cgi-bin/dna/combineAcctsN.cgi



Disclosure Timeline



Thu, Nov 10, 2016 at 4:25 PM: Reached out to vendor requesting PGP key to

securely exchange details of vulnerabilities identified



Thu, Nov 10, 2016 at 4:55 PM: Vendor requests report be physically mailed

to PO box via Postal Service



Wed, Nov 16, 2016, at 11:14 AM: Report mailed to vendor via USPS Certified

Mail



Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 10:43 AM: Request Vendor acknowledge receipt of the

report



Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 12:53 PM: Vendor acknowledges receiptI3/4 suggests

placing the software behind a firewall as a solution to the vulnerabilities.



Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 1:54 PM: Reply that the offered solution mitigates

some risk, but does not address the vulnerabilitiesI3/4 inquire if there is a

plan to address the vulnerabilities



Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 3:13 PM: Vendor replies aa|Yes, we have a plan. Please

gather a DNA sequence, PO Number, or Fund Number and go to your local

grocery store and see what it will buy you.a



Tue, Feb 28, 2017, at 1:15 PM: Vulnerabilities disclosed to US-CERT



Tue, Mar 7, 2017, at 8:19 AM: Vulnerabilities submitted to MITRE for CVE

assignment



Wed, Mar 8, 2017, at 12:00 PM: Vulnerabilities disclosed publicly